Not only did Manchuria captivate Japan's ideas of imperialism, but so did Southeast Asia. Their desires to expand were again met with U.S. restrictions and this time, Japan knowingly made critical decisions that with one U.S. response, led them to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor.
In discussing Japan’s response to U.S. foreign policies, which ultimately sparked the attack on Pearl Harbor and the birth of the Pacific War, it is important to introduce the Japanese military influence in Southeast Asia as well as the surprisingly large role that mass media played in the build-up of the war. As author Mark R. Peattie notes, the conflict over Southeast Asia was one of the most immediate causes of the Pacific War.* Although prior to World War I, Southeast Asia was nothing more than a place for commercial ventures, developments in the late Meiji Period that included a bigger role for the navy as well as creating published texts in order to generate more buzz about the region’s importance to Japan.* What sparked after World War I was an expansion of Japan’s role in the region’s economy as there was more trade and pouring in of capital. This economic emergence paved the way for industries like commerce, banking, and transportation to blossom, and it caused Japan to realize just how much value the region was to them in the 1930s.*
The term “nanshin,” meaning “southward advance,” was used repeatedly by the Japanese since as early as the sixteenth century, and it basically followed this belief that Japan had a destiny to advance South.* It was their version of a Manifest Destiny. Japan’s purely economic reasons for wanting to expand to Southeast Asia were due largely in part to the fact that the region was chock-full of raw materials Japan desired.* Well, as the narrative continued to follow suit, the Southeast Asia pursuit was no different: all of Southeast Asia was under the control of the Western powers. How would Japan fulfill its desired “nanshin?” It would be wise to assume that Japan turned to military aggression as a solution to infiltrating the region, but surprisingly they realized that they could serve as an economic player by adhering to the Western colonial orders.*
*Japan was proving to be an economic threat to the West in Southeast Asia and many people believed that the West only criticized Japan’s role in the region because they could not compete with their markets.* Regardless, the Western colonial powers began to catch on to the threat Japan posed to their own economies, and responded with hostility. Western restrictions on Japanese exports, capital, and migration to Southeast Asia were placed in order to push Japan out of the region. One of the big problems was that big Japanese entrepreneurs players like Haruji Matsue had come to dominate and control the region with established firms, industries, and commercial interests.* So on one hand, there was the Japanese argument where frustrations were arising due to the restrictions the West put on expanding business in Southeast Asia. On the other, there were the Western powers who were agitated that Japan was taking it upon themselves to operate and grow businesses and industry.
Japan’s destiny toward “nanshin” remained near and dear, and the decision by the navy to take over the French Indochina was a major contributor to the looming war. Japan almost foreshadowed the events to come once they seized Indochina, and they eventually did, as the U.S. completely embargoed resources to and from Japan. Instead of taking a step back, Japan responded by invading the East Indies in pursuit of oil.* Aside from the decisions made by Japan in Indochina and the East Indies, the embargo on all Japanese resources fully caused Japan to rally behind their destiny to conquer Southeast Asia. The result? One step closer to the ledge in which the Pacific War was waiting at the bottom.
This is an August 1941 letter from Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro to former a Foreign Minister. This came after the United States responded with restrictions on Japan after they went through with invading French Indochina. Significance: In the letter Fumimaro admits he was wrong to have underestimated the effects it had on U.S.-Japanese relations.*Going back to Louise Young’s article on the Manchuria conflict, it is worth noting the rather large role mass media played in leading Japan to the Pacific War. She claims that while many people traditionally view wartime Japan as a time of militant power, much of the army’s momentum was generated by mass media propaganda.* Again, the media’s endorsements of the army’s occupation of Manchuria was also met by Japanese radio, media, and popular culture to rally around the updates. Not to mention, this allowed industries to make consumer goods that were army and military themed in order to boost earnings during the depression.* Although many business elites disagreed with the army’s efforts in Manchukuo, they realized they could not compete with the media. Rather they remained silent and went along with it: they gave village elites in Manchukuo leadership roles. This in turn boosted up local societies and there was more local efforts to unify Japan through the exertion of power.* These were crucial ways in which mass media and Japanese society provided power to the government and business elites without them having to do anything, and this increased power led to military based decisions leading to wartime.
Action clips from the Pearl Harbor Bombing. Although these clips have been seen by many in different angles, the sheer mass and devastation speaks to the conflicts that caused Pearl Harbor to happen.*U.S. President Roosevelt addressing Congress about the decision to declare war.*
December 1941 letter from Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru to a statesman. In the letter Yoshida feared that there was no longer any way to stop the crumbling U.S.-Japanese relations. This initiated the Imperial staff meeting Japan organized that essentially mapped out their entrance into the war.*Footnotes:
1. Peattie, Mark R. "Nanshin: The "Southward Advance," 1931-1941, as a Prelude to the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia." Duus, Peter et al. The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945. Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1996, 189.
2. Ibid, 191.
3. Ibid, 193.
4. Ibid, 189.
5. Ibid, 196.
6. Ibid, 194.
7. San Emeterio Cabanes, Gonzalo. "Saipan under Japanese Colonial Rule." Map.
8. Ibid, 203.
9. Ibid, 206.
10. Ibid, 222.
11. Letter from Konoe Fumimaro to Arita Hachiro. 3 Aug. 1941. Outbreak of War Between Japan and the U.S., Modern Japan in Archives.
12. Young, Louise. "Imagined Empire: The Cultural Construction of Manchukuo." Duus, Peter et al. The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945. Princeton, N.J, Princeton University Press, 1996, 95.
13. Ibid, 74.
14. Ibid, 96.
15. Japanese Navy Air Service Aircraft Attack Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Hawaii in December 1941. Huntley Film Archives.
16. President Roosevelt Addressing Congress Immediately after the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.Huntley Film Archives.
17. Letter from Yoshida Shigeru to Maniko Nobuaki. 1 Dec. 1941. Outbreak of War Between Japan and the U.S., Modern Japan in Archives.
Comments