It was 1943, a little under two years into World War II, when Japan found themselves desperately slumping to get past the Allies. Their underestimating of the Western strength caused them to face some harsh but inevitable changes to their war aims. The problem? Their new war aims undermined their plans of Asian imperialism, which was the biggest motivation for getting into the war in the first place.
"The countries of Greater East Asia will ensure the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity." - Doctrine 2, Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere*
While it would be worthwhile to explain the major events during the bulk of World War II and how they had an effect on each country, looking at the latter end of the war is more important for explaining some of the unanswered questions that led Japan to war in the first place. By this time Japan had already went through with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor, plunging both them and the united States deep in the Pacific War. Is it fair to say that Japan’s path to Pearl Harbor was impulsive? Not necessarily, because after the contributing turmoil of the United States mentioned in the previous posts, action was inevitable. However, in Akira Iriye’s Power and Culture, she notes that while Japan rejoiced over the successful Pearl Harbor mission, it was nearing time to redefine it’s war aims. Most notably in the latter years of the war, Japan admitted that the U.S. and Britain were superior in shipping and aircraft.* Over the course of the war, Japan’s military position slowly waned and they realized that assistance China and other Asian countries would prove to be a necessary strategic move. Another obstacle Japan had to face was a shortage of wartime ships. They knew they needed to increase their fleet, but the only way to do that was at the expense of commercial cargo ships that brought goods to and from China.* They chose to do it, putting their economy at danger, but if they didn’t, the enemy attacks (mainly by submarine) could’ve been catastrophic to Japan’s war effort.
Japan’s outline for a partnership with China was both ironic and puzzling, but they had to have known that the only way an outline would be agreed upon by China would be through a compromise. Nevertheless, the growing uncertainty caused Japan to act: their partnership forced Japan to give more rights to the Asian countries they so greatly wanted to colonize. Not only did these rights include more long term aid from Japan but these countries also demanded independence from Japanese military rule.* Japan really had to ask themselves: what are our political objectives? The war was shaping up to be overwhelming for Japan’s military and by reaching out to other Asian nations for assistance, they were at a crossroads. Nevertheless, Japan redefined its war aims by trying to reel in China to their greater goal of freeing Asia from the Western Powers, and by late 1943, their objectives became clear again. This partnership Japan offered would allow other Asian countries forgive them and see their sincerity, while it would also help them focus on taking down the United States. But what they would go on to lose, their ultimate goal in going to war which was defending their imperial rule, was hard to cope with. By agreeing to China’s sovereignty, Japan was really losing their opportunity to create an Asian empire even if they won the war.*
In a difficult decision on which direction to go, China ultimately signed the declaration at the Greater East Asia Conference in November 1943.* The declaration had a total of five doctrines, and for the sake of their significance, they will be listed in an image below provided by the CIA, but each doctrine spoke of co-prosperity in Asia. By this point, the war’s end was coming closer, but Japan needed everything and everyone they had to go all in: all Japanese ships given to the military, unity of Asia, and the defense of the Japanese empire, which by this point was significantly smaller!* With this effort, those in power in Japan had to inform its people at home that these domestic changes were on the horizon and that the war aims going forward, while they looked extremely different to the plans of imperialism, were worth fighting for.*
Skip ahead to late summer, 1945 when the Allies came together for the Potsdam Conference, planning out how they would construct an outline for the Axis to surrender. The views of Japan in the minds of Americans were nothing short of extreme. Naval Captain, M.L. Pence believed Japan should be “destroyed both as a power and as a culture."* To him the Japanese were “international bandits and not safe on Earth.” Thankfully, other officials believed that Japanese society was not to blame for the emergence of imperialism and militarism. In their view, the was a “subversion” not an “expression” of Japan’s cultural aspirations. This view actually leads nicely into the deeper connections Japan and the U.S. may have shared all along.
To begin, it’s important to look at the doctrines of the Greater East Asia declaration. Iriye brings up a striking comparison to America and Britain’s Atlantic Charter that laid out the frameworks for international peace, justice, and economic collaboration and cooperation. This then sparks the question: if both the U.S. and Japan had similar desires and frameworks in their charters, why were they enemies in the war in the first place? Based on the events leading up to the war, this question can be negated, but there are surprising parallels in the official thoughts about war aims and peace objectives. Both the U.S. and Japan really did have similar goals for Asia and the Pacific, being that regional stability, economic development, and domestic order would lead to peace. The result of these goals? An inevitable desire by both countries to achieve colonial power, and over the course of the war Japanese and American thoughts were converging rather than separating. Iriye summarizes this comparison by stating that the Japanese War was a power conflict. Little conflict between nations formed around economic, cultural, and ideological terms.* Is it possible that Japan only formed the declaration with China and other Asian countries to give them leverage to win the war? Perhaps, but considering the fact that Japan failed to agree to the terms laid out at Potsdam, they had to have known the objectives they were sacrificing by compromising with Asia.
Cover art for a major Japanese propaganda magazine, Shashin Shuho, which included lifestyle stories mixed with pro military updates. Although this cover was from Christmas Eve, 1941, it is clear that the cover's message is getting through: Japan's Army was coming out of the gates armed and ready to fight for its people. One heading from the magazine reads: "Tripartite Pact further strengthened agreement Announcement by the Information Bureau (December 11th, 11 pm) Germany and Italy have decided to participate in the war against the United States, and in Berlin on the 11th, Ambassador Oshima of the Empire and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop of Germany. Joint execution of the war against the United States and Britain…"*Footnotes:
1. "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Office of Strategic Services Research and Analysis Branch, 10 Aug. 1945.
2. Iriye, Akira. Power and Culture the Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 . Cambridge, MA , Harvard University Press, 1981, 96.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid, 98.
5. Ibid, 101.
6. Ibid, 119.
7. Ibid, 116.
8. Ibid, 121.
9. Ibid, 123.
10. Ibid, 148.
11. Shashin Shuho (Pictorial Weekly) Magazine Cover Page. 24 Dec. 1941. Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, www.jacar.go.jp.